

The Application of Optimality-theoretic Pragmatics to the Reappraisal of the Role of *lɛɛw45* in Thai*

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This paper discusses the role of the particle *lɛɛw45* in Thai. *lɛɛw45* has been claimed to denote the perfective aspect (Kanchanawan, 1978 and Boonyapatipark, 1983). The reappraisal of the role of *lɛɛw45* in this paper, however, offers an argument against this claim. Basically, the actual data show that *lɛɛw45* in fact occurs in predicates of various types including those carrying imperfectiveness. Furthermore, the availability and the use of the alternative sentence without *lɛɛw45* to denote the same temporal properties of an event suggest that the addition of *lɛɛw45* is not mainly aimed at temporal effects. Rather, its presence generates a presupposition concerning the hearer's knowledge on the previous status of the topic. This is to suggest that this piece of knowledge is invalid and must be corrected. Based on optimality-theoretic pragmatics proposed by Blutner (2000) and its application in discourse particles and presupposition pioneered by Zeevat (2002, 2004, 2009), the paper exhibits the competitions between the alternative marked with *lɛɛw45* and the zero-marked alternative in particular contexts. The former wins in the context where a presupposition is required while the latter is preferred when only a factive report is required. Regarding its role in terms of temporality, *lɛɛw45* indicates the realisation of an event which corresponds to the concept of Event Realisation proposed by Bohnemeyer and Swift (2004). However, this temporal function is merely a requirement when *lɛɛw45* generates presupposition.

1. INTRODUCTION

Several studies have been carried out in order to explore the operation of *lɛɛw45*. In her study, Kanchanawan (1978) regards *lɛɛw45* as a post-serial particle which acts either as a perfective aspect marker or a past time marker while Scovel (1970) proposes that it denotes the completion of the event. Following these claims, in (1) it can be concluded that the addition of *lɛɛw45* to the sentence generates the perfectiveness of the event, thereby asserting that the event '*kiŋ22maay42 hak22*' or '*the branch break*' already happened before the time of utterance. Also, the presence of *lɛɛw45* enables the sentence to satisfy the truth-condition '*the sentence is true if and only if there was a branch and it broke at time t*'.

- (1) kiŋ22maay42 hak22 lɛɛw45
branch break
'The branch broke.'

Nonetheless, the perfectiveness as well as the completion of the event in (1) can still be derived even when *lɛɛw45* is not added. Moreover, in fact the presence of *lɛɛw45* offers other meanings which do not primarily concern temporality. The comparative analyses on the presence and the absence of *lɛɛw45* in predicates of various types provide supporting evidence for the current claim. They suggest that the two options yield the same temporal effects and importantly the former gives extra meanings.

* I would like to express my thanks to Dr. Eytan Zweig and Dr. George Tsoulas, my supervisors, for their insightful, valuable comments. I would also like to thank them for their encouragement. Without it, the ideas in this research would not have been initiated and nurtured.

The first piece of evidence lies in achievement predicates. In an achievement like (1) perfectiveness can be reached even if the sentence is left unmarked. The reason is that a predicate of this type carries a default natural end point. The lexical aspect of the achievement verb suggests that the event happened and terminated within a small fraction of time. As such, the whole event naturally terminated before the utterance time. This thus denotes the perfectiveness of the event. Moreover, the absence of *lɛɛw45* in this type of predicate does not affect the sentence's value of being true in the truth-condition '*the sentence is true if and only if there was a branch and it broke at time t*' at all. It is also noteworthy that the addition of a past time expression, which refers to the exact event time, conveys the same temporal property of the event and still satisfies the truth-condition.

The second piece of evidence is derived from stative predicates. Unlike an achievement, a stative represents an event which continuously runs on the time line that overlaps the reference time. A definite end point is not identified. Generally, the unmarked alternative suffices to report the state of the topic at the reference time. This is illustrated in (2) in which the run time of the event '*the water be hot*' overlaps both the reference time and the utterance time. The predicate '*nam45 rɔɔn45*' or '*the water is hot*' asserts the current state of '*being hot*' of the water and thus denotes the imperfectiveness of the event. The marked alternative in (3) gives the same assertion as in (2). However, it also highlights the change of state from '*being not hot*' to '*being hot*' of the water. Even though the previous state of '*being not hot*' of the water is not discretely asserted through the sentence, the presence of *lɛɛw45* suggests that it is referred to covertly and an emphasis that the water has been changed to a new state is made.

(2) *nam45 rɔɔn45*
water hot
'The water is hot.'

(3) *nam45 rɔɔn45 lɛɛw45*
water hot
'The water is hot (previously it was not).'

The last piece of evidence is found in cases where *lɛɛw45* co-occurs with the progressive/imperfective aspect marker *kam33lan33*. This case is interesting due to the organisation of the predicate which seems to contain both imperfectiveness and perfectiveness.

(4) *maa45 kam33lan33 wiŋ42 pay33*
horse PROG run go
'The horse is running out.'

(5) *maa45 kam33lan33 wiŋ42 pay33 lɛɛw45*
horse PROG run go
'The horse is running out (previously it was not).'

In the unmarked version in (4), the overall nature of the event '*maa45 wiŋ42*' is determined by the progressive/imperfective aspect marker '*kam33lan33*' which suggests that the event time overlaps the reference time and the utterance time. The post-serial verb '*pay33*' is added to signal the direction of the action. This version thus depicts an ongoing event of the horse running out. Similar to (2), it reports the event as a fact. Considering (5), the co-existence of perfectiveness and imperfectiveness is probably assumed. However, in fact perfectiveness is not generated at all. Despite the presence of *lɛɛw45*, the ongoingness of the event still prevails and the progressive/imperfective reading can still be derived. Moreover, there is an

emphasis on the change of state of the horse which suggests that it is no longer in the state of 'not running' but is currently in the state of 'running'.

These findings have shown that, first of all, it is not always the case that *lɛɛw45* marks the end point of the event and suggests perfectiveness. Moreover, it can be embedded in a predicate with ongoing event and does not affect the imperfective reading. These findings suggest that the conventional claim that *lɛɛw45* denotes the perfectiveness or the completion of the event should be revised. Secondly, comparing the alternatives marked with *lɛɛw45* to the unmarked alternatives, the cases discussed above show that both varieties suggest the same temporal properties of the events. However, in each case while the unmarked alternative reports a fact involving the topic, the marked alternative gives a particular emphasis on the change of state of the topic.

These two major remarks lead to two research questions regarding 1) the reason behind the selection of the alternative marked with *lɛɛw45* as an appropriate utterance for a particular context and 2) the main role that *lɛɛw45* actually plays.

2. A COMPARISON BETWEEN MARKED AND UNMARKED ALTERNATIVES

In the previous section it has been pointed out that by adding *lɛɛw45* the previous state of the topic before the utterance time is covertly referred to and the change to the new state is emphasised. In order to provide clear explanations on these observations a further analysis is carried out.

- (6) plaa33thɔɔŋ33 taay33 lɛɛw45
 goldfish die
 'The goldfish died (previously it was alive).'

Similar to (1), the achievement in (6) shows that apart from the assertion that the event terminated before the reference time, the change of state of the goldfish from 'being alive' to 'being dead' is derived. The altered state, which is the subsequent result from the termination of the event 'the goldfish died at time *t*', is highlighted. Such emphasis hints that the altered state of the topic is not consistent to what the hearer currently knows or expects. It can be assumed that the hearer's knowledge and expectation on the status of the goldfish before the utterance time, which is 'being alive', is presupposed. The presupposition generated in (6) is drawn up in (7). (6) is true only under the condition proposed in (8).

- (7) 'There was a unique goldfish and before the utterance time it was expected to be in the state of being alive.'
- (8) '(6) is true if and only if there was a unique goldfish which was expected to be in the state of being alive and it died at time *t*.'

In order to confirm the existence of the above presupposition in the alternative marked with *lɛɛw45*, Levinson's (1983) tests are adopted. These tests are based on the concept that as presuppositions of a sentence are made up of background information, they must survive either in the case where the sentence is negated or where it becomes an interrogative. In order to make the assumption clear, in each test a comparison between the two alternatives is also provided.

- (9) plaa33thɔɔŋ33 may42 taay33 lɛɛw45
 goldfish not die
 'The goldfish did not die (previously it was expected to die).'

Similar to the case of the declarative marked with *lɛw45* in (6), (9) suggests that the whole event already terminated before the utterance time. It also signals the presupposition '*before the utterance time it was expected that the goldfish would die*' which contradicts the information offered in the assertion. The truth-condition of (9) is as follows:

- (10) '(9) is true if and only if there was a unique goldfish which was expected to die and it did not die at time *t*.'

As for the unmarked negation in (11), it just presents a fact about the goldfish, that is, it did not die. This fact does not generate a presupposition involving the hearer's expectation about the goldfish at all.

- (11) plaa33thooŋ33 may42 taay33
goldfish not die
'The goldfish did not die.'

In the case of interrogative, (6) can be transformed to an interrogative via the presence of the question word '*ru45yaŋ33*' as in (12). This question word is very interesting in that, first of all, semantically it sets the temporal boundary, that is, some point prior and up to the utterance time. In addition, pragmatically, it signifies that something is expected to happen at some point in this time boundary. In the case of (12), the goldfish is expected to die at some point in time before and up to the utterance time. The question is thus asked in order to check if the expected incidence has already happened. The truth-condition is proposed accordingly in (13). Interestingly, with the presence of the question word '*ru45yaŋ33*' the unmarked alternative is considered infelicitous while the alternative marked with *lɛw45* is obligatory.

- (12) plaa33thooŋ33 taay33 (lɛw45) ru45yaŋ33
goldfish die QUESTION
'Has the goldfish died?'

- (13) 'Is it the case that there was a unique goldfish which was expected to die and it died at time *t*?'

The question for the unmarked alternative can be generated as demonstrated in (14) by the addition of the question word '*may45*' which determines that the temporal boundary in the question covers only the time span before the utterance time. Thus, the question is supposed to refer only to one point in the past at which the event happened. It is asked in order to check if the event happened or not and does not suggest any expectation as the question word '*ru45yaŋ33*' does. Therefore, a reply marked with *lɛw45* is infelicitous.

- (14) plaa33thooŋ33 taay33 may45
goldfish die QUESTION
'Did the goldfish die?'

The results from the tests show that the presupposition generated by *lɛw45* survives in all sentences in the family. It is fairly clear in cases of negation and interrogative that the message conveyed in the sentence marked with *lɛw45* always contrasts with the presupposition.

From the comparisons between the alternatives marked with *lɛw45* and the unmarked alternatives, it is noticeable that a remarkable difference between them lies in the expectation on the state of the topic before the utterance time. This expectation is presupposed only in the alternative marked with *lɛw45*. This fact is twofold. Firstly, it is clear that the

presupposition carries the old information, which is the previous state of the topic, while the assertion yields the new information, which is the altered state of the topic. Secondly, the new information suggests that a correction is needed in order that the common ground that the interlocutors share will be updated and the conversation can be continued without confusion. In an unmarked alternative the need for a correction is not expressed. According to these facts, there are thus cases where the alternative marked with *lɛɛw45* is obligatory while its unmarked counterpart is unacceptable. Short dialogues in (15) to (17) exemplify this type of case.

(15) A: haay42 ʔaa33haan24 plaa33thɔɔŋ33 kan33thə22
 give food goldfish let us
 'Let's feed the goldfish.'

B: plaa33thɔɔŋ33 taay33 lɛɛw45 (*plaa33thɔɔŋ33 taay33)

(16) A: plaa33thɔɔŋ33 too33 khun42 maak42 chay42may45
 goldfish grow up a lot QUESTION
 'The goldfish has grown a lot, right?'

B: plaa33thɔɔŋ33 taay33 lɛɛw45 (*plaa33thɔɔŋ33 taay33)

(17) A: thəə33 naa42 ʔaw33 plaa33thɔɔŋ33 pay33 pra22kuat22
 you should take goldfish go contest
 'You should enter the goldfish to the show contest.'

B: plaa33thɔɔŋ33 taay33 lɛɛw45 (*plaa33thɔɔŋ33 taay33)

In (15), apparently there is a unique goldfish that both A and B know. As he expects that the goldfish is still in the state of being alive, A asks B to go feed the fish with him. Nevertheless, B knows that the fish is no longer in that state and in fact already died. He thinks it is necessary that A get the new information and the common ground be corrected. In order to assert the new information and suggest a correction he opts for the sentence marked with *lɛɛw45*. The same phenomenon also happens in (16) and (17) in which the antecedents uttered by A indicate that his expectation that the goldfish is still in the state of being alive is incorrect and needs to be replaced with the correct, new information, that is, the goldfish is now in the state of being dead. Due to the fact that a correction is vital, the unmarked alternative, which does not satisfy the intension of the speaker, is unacceptable and thus not chosen.

3. PRESUPPOSITION IN OPTIMALITY-THEORETIC PRAGMATICS

In the previous section, the presence of *lɛɛw45* has been proven to offer a presupposition and suggest a correction. In this section, the operation of *lɛɛw45* in such a respect as well as the motivation behind the addition of it to the sentence will be explored and explained under optimality-theoretic pragmatics. The constraints for presupposition which are innovated in accordance with the concept of this theory by Zeevat (2002, 2004, 2009) will be implemented.

The constraints are developed from the presupposition principles drawn from Heim's (1983) and Van der Sandt's (1992) theories of presupposition. The principles are aimed at solving the problem of presupposition projection by providing the conditions of the context under which the presupposition will be true. A summarised version of these presupposition principles are as follows:

- (18) (i) presupposition triggers have a presupposition p that must hold at the site of the trigger
(ii) p should be resolved to an accessible part of the context of the trigger
(iii) If this is not possible p should be accommodated (added to some context of the trigger)
(iv) p should preferably be added to the outermost context of the trigger if it is consistent there.

(Zeevat, 2009: 193)

Principle (i) requires that when a presupposition trigger is present in the sentence, it must offer a presupposition. Also, the truth of the presupposition must hold; otherwise, the speaker cannot use the trigger. Presupposition, according to principle (ii), must be generated in an accessible context. In other words, it must involve what is in the common ground or known both by the speaker and the hearer. Accordingly, it is resolved rather than accommodated. As accessibility is present, further presupposed information is deemed unnecessary and resolution is preferred over accommodation. However, if the context is not accessible and a resolution for the presupposition is not possible, principle (iii), calls for accommodation for that presupposition. Finally, according to principle (iv), presupposition should be added to the context in the way that does not make it inconsistent. This means that presupposition must be added to the context in which it is required but must be forbidden in the context that does not require it.

However, taking real situations into account, these four principles do not provide substantial reasoning behind the presence of presupposition in a sentence. With a closer look at the perspectives of both the speaker and the hearer, Zeevat (2002, 2004, 2009) incorporates the fundamental ideas of optimality-theoretic pragmatics proposed by Blutner (2000) which incorporates the neo-Gricean Q-principle and I-principle. The Q-principle, under which the speaker is obliged to make his contribution as informative as required, operates on form and blocking mechanism. It appraises all the possible syntactic tokens that the speaker could have used to express the intended meaning and block those that do not correspond to it. The I-principle, which asks the speaker not to make his contribution more informative than is required, operates on meaning. It assesses all possible meanings for the same syntactic token and allows the most coherent interpretation.

With the integration of production and comprehension in optimality-theoretic pragmatics, the four principles are transformed into four presupposition constraints: FAITH, PLAUSIBLE, *NEW, and RELEVANCE. These constraints have their merits from incorporating the perspective of the hearer into the speaker's production. Apart from the speaker's syntactic/semantic reasoning behind his production which is represented in the four principles, the constraints provide pragmatic reasoning. Generally, the hearer takes the position of the speaker and calculates what he could have produced and why he would have done so. While under principle (i), presupposition is demanded to be present at the site of the trigger, FAITH asks the hearer to take the speaker's position and consider the same syntactic expression he could have used to convey that presupposition. Following principle (ii) which specifies that presupposition must be in the common ground, PLAUSIBLE requires that the hearer consider plausible interpretations for the form the speaker uses. This constraint prevents the hearer from deriving the interpretations that exhibit the conflict between the current utterance and what is already known. Due to PLAUSIBLE, presupposition can be solved in the context and full accommodation is unnecessary and, therefore, resolution is preferred over accommodation. This leads to the third constraint, *NEW, which suggests that presupposition contains given or not new information and that an old referent is preferred. Accordingly, this constraint prohibits any further introduction of presupposed information. Lastly, according to principle (iv), presupposition should preferably be added to the context if it is compatible and indispensable there. Considering the hearer's perspective, it prompts him

to raise a question regarding the motivation behind the speaker's conveying presupposition. The final constraint RELEVANCE asks for the answer that captures the point why the presupposition and the function of the trigger are in priority. The four constraints are ranked as shown in (19):

- (19) FAITH >>PLAUSIBLE>>*NEW>>RELEVANCE

4. THE TRIAL OF PRESUPPOSITION CONSTRAINTS ON THE MARKED ALTERNATIVE

In this section, the use of $l\epsilon\epsilon w45$ as presented in Section 2 will be reanalysed in order to show how the four presupposition constraints are satisfied when $l\epsilon\epsilon w45$ is present. This will again be demonstrated through (6), which is restated in (20), and its presupposition in (7), which is restated in (21).

- (20) $plaa33th\omega\eta33$ $taay33$ $l\epsilon\epsilon w45$
 goldfish die
 'The goldfish died (previously it was alive).'

- (21) 'There was a unique goldfish and before the utterance time it was expected to be in the state of being alive.'

As discussed in Section 1, the alternative without $l\epsilon\epsilon w45$ in fact denotes the perfectiveness of the event '*the goldfish die*'. Also, as proposed, the presence of $l\epsilon\epsilon w45$ signifies the change of state of the goldfish from '*being alive*' to '*being dead*' as well as the presupposition in (21). The speaker utters the version marked with $l\epsilon\epsilon w45$ mainly to convey these two notions which finally lead to a correction in the common ground. The existence of the intended presupposition corresponds to FAITH which asks the hearer to consider the marked alternative as the appropriate syntactic token he would have uttered had he been the speaker. The hearer is also aware that had the speaker intended to communicate only the fact about the goldfish, the alternative without $l\epsilon\epsilon w45$ would have been selected. Considering the topic of the utterance, ' $plaa33th\omega\eta33$ ' or 'the goldfish' is definite. This suggests that there is a particular goldfish that both interlocutors know and it is thus already within their common ground. This means that the presupposition can be resolved in the accessible part of the context and thus represents PLAUSIBLE. Furthermore, the uniqueness of the goldfish consequently suggests an old referent. Therefore, full accommodation or the need for any additional information on the goldfish is unnecessary. This corresponds to the third constraint, *NEW. Regarding the truth-condition of the sentence, the truth-condition, '*there was a unique goldfish and it died at time t*' can be derived from both the alternative marked with $l\epsilon\epsilon w45$ and the zero-marked alternative. However, only when the speaker intends also to pass on the presupposition in (21) and suggest a correction on the relevant part of information in the common ground, $l\epsilon\epsilon w45$ is added. This represents an appropriate answer to the activated question regarding the rationale behind the speaker's selection of the alternative marked with $l\epsilon\epsilon w45$ that the hearer raises. The alternative marked with $l\epsilon\epsilon w45$ is chosen when presupposition is required while the unmarked alternative is preferred when only a factive report is required. Accordingly, the final constraint, RELEVANCE, is satisfied.


Besides the prevalence of presupposition in the utterance marked with $l\epsilon\epsilon w45$, it is also worthwhile to address another function of $l\epsilon\epsilon w45$ as a correction marker. While triggering presupposition, $l\epsilon\epsilon w45$ also marks the context of correction. In (20), the assertion denotes the change of state of the goldfish from '*being alive*', which is old and wrong information, to '*being dead*', which is new and correct information. The new information activates correction which requires that the common ground be updated. Such correction holds under the condition in (22):

(22) *correct* (CG, φ) holds iff $CG \models \neg\varphi$ (Zeevat, 2004: 184)

According to (22), a correction holds if and only if the common ground contradicts the assertion. In (20), the common ground entails that '*it is not the case that the goldfish, which was a unique one, died at a point before the topic time*'. This obviously contradicts the assertion which suggests otherwise. As such, *lɛɛw45* marks the context of correction.


All of the analyses above indicate that the selection of the alternative with *lɛɛw45* and the unmarked alternative is dependent on the particular context in which one alternative is preferred over the other. This phenomenon can be concluded in terms of optimality-theoretic pragmatics which exhibits the competition between plausible alternatives in a particular context. A marked alternative, which represents complex form and analytical meaning or [$*F \rightarrow *M$], is optimal in a marked context while an unmarked alternative, which represents simple form and simple meaning or [$F \rightarrow M$], is optimal in an unmarked context. Such optimisation is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1 *Optimisation under optimality-theoretic pragmatics*



The above mechanism is supposed to describe the competition between the alternative marked with *lɛɛw45* and the zero-marked alternative in which either of them can be chosen as optimal output. According to the nature of the alternative marked *lɛɛw45* which satisfies the four presupposition constraints and of the unmarked alternative which does not, general properties can be outlined. The unmarked alternative offers simple form and simple meaning while the alternative marked with *lɛɛw45* offers complex form and analytical meaning. The competition between them involves the existence of the speaker's need for presupposition and correction. In a marked context where such need is present, the alternative marked with *lɛɛw45*, which represents complex form and gives analytical meaning, becomes optimal. On the contrary, in an unmarked context in which the speaker merely wants to convey a fact, only simple form and simple meaning are required. In this case, the unmarked alternative is optimal. Figure 2 illustrates the optimisation in these two contexts.

Figure 2 *Optimisation of the alternative marked with lɛɛw45 and the unmarked alternative*



Further explanations on the above optimisation are provided through two real contexts in (23) and (24).

(23) A: haay42 ʔaa33haan24 plaa33thɔɔŋ33 kan33thə22
 give food goldfish let us
 'Let's feed the goldfish.'

B: plaa33thɔɔŋ33 taay33 lɛw45 (*plaa33thɔɔŋ33 taay33)

In (23), which is the restatement of (15), the antecedent uttered by A shows that he expects that the goldfish is still in the state of 'being alive'. However, B deems it as invalid and contradictory with the truth that the change of state of the goldfish took place and the fish is in fact in the state of 'being dead'. In such marked context, B's intention to induce the presupposition and suggest a correction is prioritised. Consequently, the marked sentence '*plaa33thɔɔŋ33 taay33 lɛw45*' which represents complex form and analytical meaning or [**F* → **M*] becomes optimal. Conversely, the unmarked alternative '*plaa33thɔɔŋ33 taay33*' which represents simple form and simple meaning or [*F* → *M*] is infelicitous and is thus blocked.

(24) A: tham33may33 thəə33 duu33 saw42 caŋ33
 why you look sad so
 'Why do you look so sad?'


B: plaa33thɔɔŋ33 taay33 (*plaa33thɔɔŋ33 taay33 lɛw45)

Contrastingly, in the short dialogue in (24), the antecedent uttered by A does not demonstrate any expectation on the state of the goldfish. The utterance indicates that A only wants to know the cause of B's sadness. In such context, B just intends to tell A that he is sad because the goldfish died. Therefore, his reply is not aimed to offer any presupposition or correction. Accordingly, the unmarked sentence '*plaa33thɔɔŋ33 taay33*' which represents [*F* → *M*] becomes optimal while its marked counterpart '*plaa33thɔɔŋ33 taay33 lɛw45*' which represents [**F* → **M*] is infelicitous.

5. *lɛw45* AND ITS TEMPORAL FUNCTION

Although, as shown in the previous sections, *lɛw45* actually plays its primary role in offering presupposition and suggesting correction, it is worthwhile to address its role in temporality. In order to do so, the whole process in which the sentence marked with *lɛw45* in (20) is selected to represent the event '*the fish died at time t*' will be discussed. An illustration of the process is provided in Figure 3.

Figure 3 *The selection of the alternative marked with lɛw45*



The whole process starts with the occurrence of the event '*the goldfish die*'. Before the event time the goldfish was in its original state of '*being alive*'. The event took place and terminated within a short moment prior to the reference time. It subsequently led to the new state of the goldfish, that is, '*being dead*'. At this point, the termination of the event and the change of the state of the goldfish are realised. Such realisation indicates that new information is obtained. It then prompts the need for the presupposition concerning the hearer's old knowledge on the previous state of the topic and for a correction. This finally results with the addition of *lεεw45* to the utterance. *lεεw45* performs its temporal function at the stage of realisation. It links the run time of the event to the reference time. Adopting the concept of Event Realisation proposed by Bohnemeyer and Swift (2004), the semantics of *lεεw45* involving temporality is proposed in (25).

$$(25) \quad [[l\epsilon\epsilon w45]] = \lambda P_{\langle s,t \rangle} \lambda t_2 \lambda e \exists e' [P(e) \wedge P(e') \wedge e' \leq_{EE} e \wedge \tau(e') \leq t_{TOP}]$$

When *lεεw45* is applied it is required that the event *e* as well as its subpart *e'* fall under the predicate *P* and the run time of *e'* is included in the topic time *t_{TOP}*.

This semantic function of *lεεw45* is secondary. The realisation of the event and the change of state of the topic is a requirement which facilitates *lεεw45*'s further operation in the pragmatic stage in which presupposition and correction are required.

6. CONCLUSION

Comparing the alternative marked with *lεεw45* with the zero-marked alternative, it is found that the presence of *lεεw45* generates presupposition regarding the hearer's expectation on the state of the topic which is in fact invalid and needs to be corrected. Contrastingly, the zero-marked alternative only reports the fact of the topic. This provides the answer for the first research question concerning the motivation behind the use of the alternative marked with *lεεw45*. *lεεw45* is preferred over zero-marking in the context where presupposition and correction, which are compatible with complex form and analytical meaning, are required. However, it is defeated by the zero-marking in the context in which only a factive report, which comes with simple form and simple meaning, is required. This phenomenon can be explained through optimality-theoretic pragmatics. Also, it leads to the answer to the second research question concerning the main role of *lεεw45*. *lεεw45* plays its primary role in pragmatic domain and thus the use of it is pragmatically motivated. Its temporal role is secondary; it is merely a requirement when *lεεw45* carries out its pragmatic function.

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